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 ABSTRACT.	The	Frauchiger-Renner	Paradox	is	an	extension	of	paradoxes	based	on	the	“Problem	of	Measurement,”	such	as	Schrödinger’s	Cat	and	Wigner’s	Friend.	All	of	these	paradoxes	stem	from	assuming	that	quantum	theory	has	only	unitary	(linear)	physical	dynamics,	and	the	attendant	ambiguity	about	what	counts	as	a	‘measurement’—i.e.,	the	inability	to	account	for	the	observation	of	determinate	measurement	outcomes	from	within	the	theory	itself.		This	paper	discusses	a	basic	inconsistency	arising	in	the	FR	scenario	at	a	much	earlier	point	than	the	derived	contradiction:	namely,	the	inconsistency	inherent	in	treating	an	improper	mixture	(reduced	density	operator)	as	a	proper,	epistemic	mixture.	This	is	an	illegitimate	procedure	that	is	nevertheless	endemic	if	quantum	theory	is	assumed	to	be	always	unitary.	In	contrast,	under	a	non-unitary	account	of	quantum	state	reduction	yielding	determinate	outcomes,	the	use	of	a	proper	mixture	for	measurement	results	becomes	legitimate,	and	this	entire	class	of	paradoxes	cannot	be	mounted.	The	conclusion	is	that	the	real	lesson	of	the	FR	paradox	is	that	it	is	the	unitary-only	assumption	that	needs	to	be	critically	reassessed.				
 
1. Introduction and Background 
 
 The Frauschiger-Renner Paradox (2018) is a much-discussed thought experiment in the 
recent literature on the foundations of quantum mechanics. This paper argues that the appropriate 
way to understand the FR paradox is as a reductio ad absurdum of the standard unitary-only 
form of quantum theory (UO QM); that is, as a logical refutation of UO QM. It also argues that 
various efforts to evade the reductio nature of the argument while retaining the unitary-only 
assumption lead to significant interpretive disadvantages. Thus, the thesis of this paper is that the 
FR paradox requires us to critically re-examine the usual assumption that quantum theory 'really' 
has only unitary evolution, and to take seriously the possibility of real non-unitarity in 
connection with measurement in quantum theory. 
 
Before proceeding, we must clarify what we mean here by ‘unitary-only quantum 
theory,’ or UO QM. In the present context, UO QM includes ‘textbook quantum theory,’ that is, 
quantum theory that includes a ‘projection postulate’ (PP). The reason for discounting the PP as 
a legitimate theoretical form of non-unitarity is as follows. The usual unitary Schrödinger 
evolution of the quantum state (called “Process 2” by von Neumann) fails to lead to the 
empirically observed determinate single outcomes and resulting Boolean event structure. The 
addition of a ‘projection postulate’ is an ad hoc move that fails to bridge the explanatory gap 
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between the linear evolution and what is observed. Indeed, the PP becomes part of the 
measurement problem, in that there is no principled physical account as to at what point in an 
interaction it should be applied. This ambiguous situation is even commonly thought to 
obligatory, with an attendant ‘shifty split’ or moveable ‘Heisenberg Cut’ that is assumed to be a 
necessary part of quantum theory. Yet it is the ambiguity of the use of the ad hoc PP in the face 
of supposedly unitary-only dynamics that leads to the class of “Schrödinger’s Cat” paradoxes 
culminating in the FR inconsistency. In contrast, a genuinely non-unitary form of quantum 
theory has a quantitative physical account of the transition from the unitary to non-unitary 
dynamics, such that the ‘Cut’ is non-arbitrary. In such a theory, projection corresponding to the 
non-unitarity arises from quantitative physical content, as opposed to being a postulate without 
any accompanying physics. To be viable, a non-unitary quantum theory must unambiguously 
give rise to quantum state reduction or ‘collapse’ well before the advent of what would otherwise 
be the flagrant macroscopic superpositions invoked in this class of paradoxes. 
 
Thus, for purposes of this discussion, all forms of quantum theory lacking a specific 
quantitative physical account of non-unitarity, including the circumstances of its onset, are 
considered as Unitary Only (UO). The usual textbook quantum theory, with only a ‘projection 
postulate’ and resulting ‘shifty split,’ is properly designated a kind of UO account, since the only 
quantitative physical account it provides for the quantum state is that of the unitary (“Process 2”) 
evolution. The present author is aware that designating textbook quantum theory as UO is a 
different usage from some authors, who take inclusion of the PP as a non-unitary form of the 
theory. However, as noted above, such approaches have no physics to support the postulated 
non-unitarity, and as such, they fail to constitute non-unitary physical theories. The only 
dynamics for which they provide a specific quantitative account is the unitary dynamics. Thus, 
they are unitary-only, even if they help themselves to a projection postulate for ostensible (after-
the-fact) consistency with the observed Boolean event structure.  To distinguish ‘textbook’ 
presentations of quantum theory that include the PP (but lack any actual physics of non-unitarity) 
from Everettian-type theories that deny collapse, we will denote the former as UOPP.1  It should 
be noted that in recent years, in view of the UO decoherence program which has often 
mistakenly been taken to ‘explain’ classical determinacy,2  PP tends to be less fashionable, and 
many mainstream discussions of quantum theory eschew the idea of PP or ‘reduction’ in favor of 
an Everettian view. The ambiguity surrounding ‘whether to postulate projection or not’ under an 
assumed linear-only dynamics is also a key aspect of the FR paradox.  
 
We now turn to specifics of the FR paradox. The paradox consists of a contradiction in 
which two sets of observers each apply quantum theory seemingly ‘correctly,’ but must 
ultimately disagree strongly on the probability of the outcome of a measurement on the same 
total system. The argument is based on an elaboration of the ‘Wigner’s Friend’ paradox with 
suitably chosen states.   
 
																																																								1	Perhaps	a	suitable	term	for	the	formulation	of	quantum	theory	having	only	the	PP	as	a	token	of	non-unitarity	is	‘fig	leaf	non-unitarity.’	2	The	UO	decoherence	program	has	been	criticized	as	circular;	see,	e.g.,	Kastner	(2014)	and	references	therein.		In	any	case,	the	results	of	the	standard	decoherence	program	can	be	derived	in	the	Transactional	Interpretation	(TI),	which	has	real	non-unitary	reduction.		Under	TI,	the	decoherence	functions	arise	from	proper	mixtures	that	can	be	given	an	epistemic	interpretation,	and	the	account	of	classical	emergence	is	non-circular	(Kastner	2019b).	
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FR(2018)	lay	out	three	assumption	upon	which they base their argument. They denote 
these Consistency (C), Single Outcome (S), and Quantum Theory’s Universal Correctness (Q). 
They say: 
 
“Assumption (Q) captures the universal correctness of quantum theory (specifically, it proclaims that an 
agent can be certain that a given proposition holds whenever the quantum mechanical Born rule assigns 
probability 1 to it), (C) demands consistency in the sense illustrated by Fig. 1, [this shows observers at 
different levels of complexity agreeing as to the outcome of a measurement at a particular level], and (S) 
ensures that, from the viewpoint of an agent who carries out a measurement, the measurement has one 
single outcome (e.g., if the agent observes z = +½  then she can be certain that she did not also observe z 
= − ½  ).” 
 
Assumption Q is stated only in terms of the Born Rule. However, the key assumption in 
the way ‘Q’ is applied is that nothing actually (physically) happens during a measurement 
beyond the establishment of unitary correlations. This is the Unitary Only assumption (UO). The 
unitary evolution corresponds to von Neumann’s unitary ‘Process 2,’ which (as noted above) is 
generally assumed to constitute the only real physical dynamics; von Neumann’s ‘Process 1,’ 
involving ‘collapse’ or reduction, is tacitly assumed not to be a real physical process.  We say 
‘tacitly’ here, since this is not made explicit in the FR paper. However, they treat ‘collapse’ 
theories as different theories from quantum theory, since they claim (in their Table III) that such 
theories violate assumption Q. Thus, they assume that theories with physical non-unitarity must 
deviate from the Born Rule (which is not the case; see Section 3). This evidences the general 
belief that ‘real’ quantum theory must lack physical reduction of the state vector—i.e., that it 
must be physically UO.  
 
 I hasten to add that the unitarity assumption underlying the FR paradox is pointed out (at 
least) by Sudbery (2019), Nurgalieva and del Rio (2019), and Araújo	(2018); I make no claim 
that the crucial role of unitarity in deriving the contradiction has not been noticed before. Indeed, 
it is only ‘by linearity’ that Frauchiger and Renner arrive at their ‘absurd superposition’ (to be 
discussed in more detail below). However, the thesis of the present paper is that the core of the 
problem ‘brought to a head’ by the FR paradox is precisely that the prevailing view of quantum 
theory (including hidden variables or ‘modal’ approaches) treats UO as an obligatory aspect of 
quantum theory, when arguably what is required for full consistency of quantum theory is that 
UO be relinquished. For an appropriate non-unitary theory, quantum theory can still perfectly 
well obey the Born Rule, thus satisfying Q as stated above. This issue is elaborated in Section 3. 
 
FR introduce their argument by envisioning a scenario with an experimenter F, his spin-½ 
system S, and his measuring device D, and another experimenter W outside the lab.  F measures 
the spin of S, finding a result. Yet it is assumed (“by linearity”) that the unitary evolution still 
continues such that W must describe F’s entire lab by an entangled state. These two levels of 
description are presented as follows: (we’ll use letters here to distinguish them from later 
equation numbers): 
 
• F assigns to his system S, after measuring its spin along z, either  
↑ S  or ↓ S        (A) 
 
• The external observer W’s assigns to S, D,  F, all of which are taken to comprise a ‘lab’ 
L, the “absurd” (their word) superposition: 
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Ψ L =
1
2 ↑ s ⊗ "z = +
1
2" D
⊗ "ψS = ↑ " F + ↓ s ⊗ "z = −
1
2" D
⊗ "ψS = ↓ " F
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
  
(B) 
 
 
From these assumptions, by way of some carefully chosen initial states and interactions, 
FR obtain a contradiction in which observers such as F at a lower level of complexity predict 
zero probability for an outcome that has a non-vanishing probability to be found by postulated 
‘super-observers’ such as W at a higher level of complexity. Bub (2017) gives a clear and 
accessible presentation of the details of the quantum states involved, which we will not repeat 
here (although this author arrives at different conclusions regarding the implications of the 
result).  It turns out that this absurd result—the reductio ad absurdum of the UO account of 
quantum theory--is not surprising if we look at an earlier stage in the construction of the FR 
paradox, which contains a fundamental inconsistency in the way in which the UO account is 
applied. 
 
 
2. The Origin of the Inconsistency 
 
Let us review the usual account of ‘measurement’ under the unitary-only (UO) 
assumption. For an observable R with eigenvalues {r}, where the system S is initially in a 
superposition ψ of eigenstates |𝑟  ,  measurement (so the story goes) consists of nothing more 
than the introduction of a correlation between S and a device D, originally in a ready state φ0: 
 
ψ φ0 → r
r
∑ φr       (1) 
 
We must first note that unitary-only quantum theory does not correctly license the 
attribution of an eigenstate |𝑟  to any system found in a definite outcome of eigenvalue r, since 
according to UO such a system continues on indefinitely, by (1), as a component subsystem of a 
composite entangled state. This applies to UOPP as well, since no physical account is given of 
‘collapse’ to an outcome eigenstate. Thus, the application of PP is not physically justified, and is 
an ad hoc move. If any ‘measured’ system actually remains a component of an entangled state as 
in (1) (and is therefore actually a subsystem of a larger composite system in a pure state), the 
inappropriateness of applying an outcome eigenstate is no more than the elementary observation 
that such a subsystem is in an improper mixed state, as opposed to a pure state or proper, 
‘epistemic’ mixed state that can be interpreted as representing ignorance about an actual 
outcome. As R. I. G. Hughes put it regarding the customary (but inadequate) account of 
‘measurement’ under the unitary-only assumption:  
 
“Alas, elegant as this treatment is, as an account of the possible to the actual it just 
won’t do. … What we would like to say, when we speak of the measurement device being in a 
mixture of [projectors corresponding to outcomes] is that it actually is in one of these pure states 
but we don’t know which; in other words, we would like to use the ignorance interpretation of 
mixtures. But, as we saw in section 5.8, this interpretation cannot be used for those mixtures 
which arise from a reduction of a pure state in a tensor-product space [like that arising from a 
unitary interaction of a system with other degrees of freedom].” (Hughes 1989, p. 283)3 																																																								3	Hughes	notes	that	this	point	was	first	made	by	Feyerabend	(1962).			
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In the present context, Hughes’ locution ‘possible to the actual’ is synonymous with 
‘non-Boolean to Boolean,’ where a Boolean event structure obeys the usual classical probability 
laws that can assign determinate outcomes in a consistent manner—which the pure state (1) does 
not allow.  Of course, the fact that empirically we always find a single outcome as a result of 
measurement (and thus a Boolean event structure) is the essence of the measurement problem 
facing unitary-only quantum theory. Under the UO assumption, the empirically observed 
Boolean event structure is a crucial (and problematic) explanandum; therefore, under UO, the 
observed Boolean events structure cannot be part of any explanans. All it can be is a ‘given’ that 
is inherently inconsistent with the theory (and for which the PP acts as a ‘band-aid’).  
 
Returning now to the problem with the improper mixture: the situation can be illustrated 
through a typical EPR-Bell state, such as the triplet s=1, m=0 state for two electrons: 
 
Ψ =
1
2 ↑ ↓ + ↓ ↑( )      (2) 
 
The state (2) assigns a probability of unity that the total spin of the system will be 1.  
 
If Alice measures electron A along the spin direction z, and Bob measures electron B 
along some arbitrary spin direction θ, each could find the outcome ‘up’ or ‘down.’ If Alice and 
Bob were to assign the corresponding eigenstates to their measured degrees of freedom, the 
possible resulting state assignments would be: 
 
↑ z ⊗ ↑ θ
↑ z ⊗ ↓ θ
↓ z ⊗ ↑ θ
↓ z ⊗ ↓ θ       (3)
 
 where	each	pairing	would	be	found	with	the	appropriate	probability	(a	function	of	the	angle	θ).	This	would	mean	that,	from	the	vantage	point	of	someone,	say	‘Walter,’	who	did	not	know	what	those	outcomes	were,	the	composite	system	would	have	to	be	in	the	proper	mixed	state:		
ρ = Pr(
i, j
∑ i, j) i z i z ⊗ j θ j θ     (4) 
 
where i,j ∈ {áâ}. But this contradicts the state (2).   
 
Nowadays, it is usually supposed that this inconsistency is not problematic, based on the 
following sort of reasoning: further entanglements of the electrons with environmental 
orthogonal states would eliminate significant interference effects for observables corresponding 
to the electron-only entanglement (2), such as total momentum. This suppression of interference 
		 6	
is taken as licensing the idea that Walter would see, in a ‘FAPP’ sense,4 what amounts to one of 
the collapsed possibilities (3). However, loss of interference does not equate to determinacy of 
outcomes, so FAPP utility doesn’t remove the logical and interpretive inconsistency highlighted 
by Hughes. In any case, this usual loophole of appealing to entanglement of the degree of 
freedom of interest with ‘external’ degrees of freedom to suppress interference is not available 
for the ‘super-observable’ allegedly measurable by W in the FR paradox, which involves all the 
entangled degrees of freedom. Thus, according to UO, consistently applied, the states (3) are 
disallowed. Out of the starting gate, this blocks construction of the paradox, since construction of 
the paradox depends on allowing some observers to assign states that they are not permitted, by 
the unitary-only assumption, to assign.  
 
Tausk (2019) also makes this point concerning unitary-only quantum theory: “What is 
wrong with this reasoning is that there is no justification for collapsing the quantum state after 
F’s experiment, as W is going to perform a measurement of an operator having large interference 
terms with respect to the given macroscopic superposition….” (My insertion in brackets.) Here, 
Tausk suggests that it is permitted to ‘collapse the quantum state’ after W performs his 
measurement, provided nobody else is going to perform a measurement of a certain kind. But 
again, ‘performing a measurement,’ in the sense of ‘getting an outcome,’ is undefined in a 
theoretical sense under UO; this is just the measurement problem.5  Under these conditions, 
‘collapsing the quantum state’ is just a calculational device, which is all that it can ever be under 
UO. Under the unitary-only assumption, treating the quantum state as collapsed is a fiction. It 
cannot accurately describe any physical system(s) but is applied only for the convenience or 
utility of an observer. This makes the account observer-dependent and instrumentalist (since 
under UO the assigned ‘collapsed’ states cannot refer to the system itself), and many of the 
extant attempts to save UO quantum theory in the face of the FR reductio resort to various forms 
of instrumentalism. Another	alternative	is	a	special	sort	of	hidden	variable	approach	(e.g.,	Sudbery	2016),	but	in	order	to	evade	the	contradiction,	that	must	also	prohibit	experimenters	from	assigning	outcome-labeled	eigenstates	to	systems	for	which	they	have	observed	outcomes,	if	a	later	measurement	of	a	certain	kind	of	observable	is	going	to	be	performed	(which,	according	to	UO,	is	always	possible).	
 
 Despite the fact that UO precludes assigning outcome-labeled eigenstates to ‘measured’ 
degrees of freedom, in the FR scenario, observers F inside the lab assign such eigenstates to their 
measured systems. This initial inconsistency naturally leads to the final inconsistent result. In 
fact, under UO, F is not using quantum theory correctly.  F’s outcome-based state assignments 
contradict the composite entangled state, just as (4) contradicts (2). Concerning the inconsistent 
state assignments, FR say:  
 
“Although the state assignment [B] may appear to be “absurd,” it does not logically contradict 
[A]. Indeed, the marginal on S is just a fully mixed state. While this is different from [B], the 
difference can be explained by the agents’ distinct level of knowledge: F has observed z and 
hence knows the spin direction, whereas W is ignorant about it.” 
 																																																								4	‘FAPP’=	‘For	All	Practical	Purposes,’	first	used	by	J.	S.	Bell	(1990).	5	Baumann	et	al	(2016)	make	a	similar	point,	but	they	assume	UO	and	treat	‘collapse’	only	as	a	subjective	updating.	Thus,	in	their	approach,	treating	improper	mixtures	as	proper	mixtures	continues,	and	there	is	no	in-principle	resolution	of	the	inconsistency.	It	can	only	be	assumed	to	remain	‘unmanifest’	based	on	the	practical	inability	of	nested	observers	to	communicate,	which	would	not	seem	to	be	guaranteed.		
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But as we saw above, and as Hughes emphasized, the ignorance interpretation of 
improper mixed states ‘simply will not do’: (B) does logically contradict (A), and the difference 
is not explainable in terms of ignorance. As we just reminded ourselves, ignorance of the actual 
outcomes of subsystem measurements does not lead to the same composite-system state as that 
of the unmeasured subsystems. The marginal on S is an improper mixed state that does not 
license an ignorance interpretation. The inconsistency between the states (A) and (B) is the same 
as that between (4) and (2). 
 
This inconsistency is so problematic that we can more immediately obtain an interpretive 
absurdity if we help ourselves, despite the unitary-only assumption, to the idea that Alice and 
Bob can correctly describe their measurement electrons by outcome-related eigenstates. We 
don’t need to invoke the sophisticated states of the FR scenario in order to get into trouble, as 
follows. Note that once Alice and Bob have measured their electrons and conferred to assess 
which of the states in (3) have been actualized, according to them, the electrons are uncorrelated; 
there is no more entanglement. This means that (according to Alice and Bob) the electrons are no 
longer in the state (1), so there is no well-defined state of total angular momentum, including no 
well-defined state of angular momentum in the z-direction. Not only does the state assignment of 
Alice and Bob disagree with (1) about the probability of a value for the total spin and z-
component of spin, it disagrees on whether these physical quantities are even capable of being 
defined for the very same degrees of freedom.  This is the sort of inconsistency—more than that, 
breakdown of theoretical coherence--resulting from overlooking the difference between an 
improper mixture and a proper mixture. 6  
 
So, to recap, under UO (which we will question below), no observer can ever correctly 
assign to her measured subsystem the eigenstate corresponding to the observed eigenvalue. 
Thus, given UO, it is not the case that both observers ‘use quantum theory correctly’ in the FR 
scenario. However, since in practice physicists routinely assign outcome-related eigenstates to 
their measured systems and never find these sorts of inconsistencies, of course this situation is 
perplexing if one insists on UO. One might settle for this sort of only-FAPP consistency based 
on the supposed practical impossibility of ‘super-observers’ like W. But as Bub (2017) correctly 
notes, “As	far	as	we	know,	there	are	no	super-observers,	but	the	actuality	of	a	measurement	outcome	can’t	depend	on	whether	or	not	a	super-observer	turns	up	at	some	point.”			
 
The fundamental problem, of course, is that unitary-only quantum theory provides no 
way to get single outcomes out of any measurement in the first place! This means that the 
condition S – which is what is empirically observed -- is incompatible with the UO assumption 
‘out of the starting gate.’ The inconsistency inherent in interpreting improper mixtures as proper 
(epistemic) mixtures is a consequence of that fact.  As Tausk (2018) and Bub (2017) have noted, 
one can maneuver around the FR inconsistency under UO by restricting the assignments of 																																																								6	Sudbery	(2016)	makes	a	similar	point	about	this	basic	inconsistency	underlying	the	FR	paradox,	attributing	it	to	the	different	observers	applying	quantum	theory	in	different	ways,	where	one	such	way	includes	the	PP.		But	as	we	have	seen,	that	is	a	‘band-aid’	form	of	UO;	i.e.,	what	we	are	calling	UOPP.	The	unitary-only	assumption	is	clearly	retained	by	FR	in	order	to	create	their	‘absurd’	superposition	(B),	which	is	similar	to	the	way	in	which	unfettered	linearity	leads	to	the	Schrodinger’s	Cat	paradox.	It	is	the	unitary-only	assumption	that	leads	to	the	alleged	existence	of	‘absurd’	macroscopic	superpositions	that	are	never	experimentally	corroborated	but	which	are	crucial	for	constructing	this	class	of	paradoxes.	Sudbery	(2019)	notes	that	explicit	non-unitary	collapse	theories	escape	the	FR	paradox.	However,	like	Nurgalieva	and	del	Rio	(2018),	he	exemplifies	such	theories	by	the	GRW	model,	which	is	not	equivalent	to	quantum	theory.	
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outcome-based eigenstates (‘collapsed’ states) based on context. The only consistent assignment 
is to restrict the ‘collapsed’ degrees of freedom to a particular designated unique and final 
‘macroscopic’ level based on what kinds of observables are being measured. But this gambit 
comes at a high cost. The negative interpretive consequences are:  
 (i)	the	assignment	of	post-measurement	outcome	eigenstates	to	measured	systems	depends	crucially	on	whether	or	not	there	will	be	a	‘super-observer’	in	the	future.	(ii)	such	assignments	are	not	ontologically	licensed	by	the	UO	account,	so	they	cannot	be	ontologically	referring;	they	are	fictions	as	regards	the	actual	physical	state	of	the	systems	so	labeled.7		(iii)	for	cases	in	which	there	is	a	super-observer,	one	must	deny	that	ordinary	experimenters	like	F	are	observing	the	macroscopic	level,	or	one	must	deny	that	there	is	ever	a	measurement	result	‘for	them,’	even	as	they	carry	out	an	ordinary	laboratory	measurement.		
 Consequence	(i)	runs	afoul	of	Bub’s	correct	observation	that	“the	actuality	of	a	measurement	outcome	can’t	depend	on	whether	or	not	a	super-observer	turns	up	at	some	point.”	This	sort	of	state	assignment	does	not	indicate	the	system's	possession	of	any	particular	actualized	outcome,	which	leads	us	to	(ii);	i.e.,	under	UO	any	such	‘collapsed’	state	assignment	is	not	ontological	–	i.e.,	not	merited	by	the	ontological	nature	of	the	system	to	which	it	is	applied.	Thus,	this	contextual	assignment	of	collapsed	states	amounts	to	instrumentalism	about	quantum	theory,	at	least	at	the	designated	‘macroscopic’	level	at	which	such	states	are	assigned.		Moreover,	under	UO,	the	fictional	‘collapsed’	state	can	be	allowed	only	based	on	certainty	about	the	non-existence	of	a	future	measurement	of	a	particular	sort	of	observable--which,	of	course,	is	never	attainable.	Wallace	(2016)	has	referred	to	this	sort	of	state	assignment	as	a	‘probabilistic’	interpretation	of	the	quantum	state	(in	contrast	with	a	‘representational,’	i.e.,	realist,	interpretation).8	
 A	related	approach,	discussed	by	A.	Drezet	(2018),	is	to	assume	that	after	some	time	T	an	observer’s	memory	of	a	measurement	result	is	‘quantum-erased,’	and	he	remembers	only	that	a	definite	result	occurs,	but	not	the	result	itself.	This	supposition	is	in	conflict	with																																																									7	The	hidden-variable	model	studied	by	Sudbery	(2016)	is	subject	to	(i)	but	not	to	(ii)	and	(iii),	since	it	has	a	two-level	description:	(1)	the	‘pilot’	state	corresponding	to	the	standard	quantum	state	under	UO	evolution,	and	(2)	the	‘beable’	or	underlying	property	state	that	is	assumed	to	be	revealed	by	the	measurement.	In	that	model,	(2)	has	an	ontological	significance,	but	it	can	only	be	a	partial	and	inadequate	description	under	FR,	since	it	must	be	interpreted	as	lacking	crucial	information	concerning	possible	future	measurements	for	the	putative	macroscopic	superpositions	of	this	class	of	paradoxes.		8	Another	recent	euphemism	for	instrumentalism	about	quantum	theory	is	a	‘normative’	interpretation,	since	that	approach	also	denies	that	quantum	states	refer	to	any	specific	physical	systems,	but	rather	are	features	of	an	instruction	manual	(quantum	theory)	for	what	an	observer	should	expect	to	experience.		This	author	is	well	aware	that	some	who	use	these	terms	don’t	want	to	identify	their	approaches	as	instrumentalist	or	antirealist,	but	according	to	the	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	they	are:	instrumentalism	is	“the	view	that	theories	are	merely	instruments	for	predicting	observable	phenomena	or	systematizing	observation	reports.”		(Chakravarty,	A.,	2017).		The	present	author	agrees	with	Wallace’s	observation	that	current	orthodoxy	is	“an	inchoate	attitude	to	the	quantum	state,	where	its	dynamics	are	[assumed	to	be]	always	unitary	but	where	it	is	interpreted	either	as	physically	representational	or	as	probabilistic,	according	to	context.”	(Wallace	2016;	my	addition	in	brackets.)	Such	an	approach	is	fundamentally	equivocal	about	the	essential	nature	of	quantum	theory,	and	therefore	does	not	constitute	a	stable	or	coherent	interpretation	of	the	theory.			
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the	fact	that	we	remember	measurement	results	(or	at	least,	if	we	are	unaccountably	forgetful	for	some	reason,	there	are	records	of	these	in	the	lab	which	is	included	in	the	superposition	supposedly	presented	to	W).	We	never	experience	being	in	a	state	in	which	we	know	with	certainty	that	a	definite	result	occurred	but	have	completely	forgotten	what	it	is--along	with	the	lab	also	being	‘quantum-erased,’	having	only	a	record	that	a	result	occurred	without	any	record	of	the	specific	result	(when	it	formerly	had	one).	One	might	argue	that	this	bizarre	situation	of	everyone	and	their	labs	losing	track	of	a	specific	result	while	knowing	for	sure	that	a	result	occurred	has	never	been	experienced	because	the	time	T	is	very	long.	But	then	this	time	T	depends	on	whether	there	will	be	a	particular	sort	of	‘super-observer’	in	the	future.	So	we	are	back	in	the	same	situation	of	the	future-dependence	of	quantum	state	assignments	as	discussed	previously.	In	this	case,	even	our	own	memories	and	the	physical	conditions	of	our	labs	would	depend	explicitly	on	the	future	existence	of	an	appropriate	super-observer.	9		One	might	argue,	following	a	suggestion	of	Baumann	et	al	(2019),	that	the	FR	contradiction	would	remain	‘unmanifest’	if	super-observers	W	and	ordinary	observers	F	can	never	communicate.		But	there	seems	to	be	nothing	preventing	this.	For	example,	W	and	F	could	each	be	modeled	as	complex	molecules	with	several	excitable	degrees	of	freedom.	For	simplicity,	let	these	degrees	of	freedom	be	subject	to	2D	state	spaces.		Assume	that	F	has	3	such	degrees	of	freedom	labeled	by	A,B,C.		Under	UO,	all	a	‘measurement’	can	be	is	the	establishment	of	a	correlation	between	different	degrees	of	freedom.	So	the	‘measurement’	of	the	initial	spin-1/2	system	at	the	level	of	F	can	be	represented	by	a	correlation	between	two	of	F’s	degrees	of	freedom	A	and	B,	where	A	plays	the	role	of	the	spin-½	system	prepared	in	an	equal	superposition	of	outcomes	‘up’	and	‘down’,	and	B	plays	the	role	of	detector/memory.		C,	a	communication	degree	of	freedom,	is	unaffected	at	this	stage.	According	to	F,	after	the	‘measurement’	of	A	by	B,	he	is	either	in	the	state	
 
  or        (5a,b) 
 
↓ A ⊗ ↓ B ⊗ 0 C  
 with	equal	probability.	On	the	other	hand,	according	to	W,	F	ends	up	in	a	Bell	state	with	the	communication	degree	of	freedom	C	along	for	the	ride:	
 
Ψ F = Φ
+ 0 C =
1
2 ↑ A ⊗ ↑ B + ↓ A ⊗ ↓ B( )⊗ 0 C    (6)
 
 Now	let	W	subject	F’s	degrees	of	freedom	A	and	B	to	a	measurement	of	the	‘Bell	observable’	for	which	the	state	 Φ+ 	is	an	eigenstate.	W’s	experiment	could	be	accompanied	by	a	signal	to	F	as	follows.	An	outcome	finding	F	in	the	state	 Φ+ 	results	in	a	photon	being																																																									9	Another	problem	with	the	account	is	that	the	‘quantum-erased’	state	is	represented	by	the	ready	state,	which	cannot	be	correct:	in	a	ready	state,	there	has	been	no	measurement	yet,	and	therefore	no	definite	result,	even	if	unknown,	has	been	found.		So	the	ready	state	cannot	be	the	same	as	the	‘quantum-erased’	state.	
↑ A ⊗ ↑ B ⊗ 0 C
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emitted	to	F	to	excite	his	other	degree	of	freedom	C.	If	F	were	to	receive	that	photon	for	every	run	of	the	experiment,	the	inconsistency	would	be	manifest,	since	according	to	F,	his	probability	of	receiving	the	photon,	given	the	mixed	state	of	his	A	and	B	degrees	of	freedom,	is	1/2.	Now,	of	course	the	practical	logistics	are	nontrivial	in	carrying	out	this	‘super-experiment,’	but	nothing	prevents	it,	in	principle,	under	UO.		Indeed,	there	is	nothing	in	the	UO	theory	to	explain	why	a	molecule	could	not	be	considered	as	‘measuring’	its	own	degrees	of	freedom	through	such	correlations,	since	under	UO,	correlation	between	degrees	of	freedom	is	the	necessary	and	sufficient	condition	for	’measurement.’10	Thus,	one	cannot	depend	on	the	idea	that	the	FR	contradiction	will	always	remain	unmanifest	in	order	to	evade	the	lack	of	experimentally	observed	inconsistencies	that	in	principle	should	result	from	the	use	of	outcome	eigenstates	to	predict	future	probabilities	for	measured	systems.		 We	might	also	note	that	assigning	fictional	‘collapsed’	states	to	what	is	(under	UO)	always	a	subsystem	of	an	entangled	state	can	only	be	an	approximate	solution,	since	interference	terms	for	composite	system	observables	are	not	absent,	but	simply	small.	The	ability	to	detect	such	tiny	interference	effects,	although	unlikely,	is	at	least	as	likely	as	the	existence	of	a	super-observer	like	W.		So	the	approximate,	FAPP,	and	equivocal	nature	of	this	tactic	for	achieving	consistency	with	empirical	observations	cannot	be	overlooked.	If	we	knew	for	a	fact	that	Nature	obeys	unitary-only	quantum	theory,	perhaps	we	would	have	to	live	with	this	situation.	However,	UO	is	not	an	established	fact.	If	there	really	is	non-unitary	collapse	in	Nature,	consistency	is	restored	in	an	exact	manner,	without	appeal	to	state	assignments	that	are	contingent	on	the	absence	of	future	‘super-observers.’	Relinquishing	the	traditional	UO	restriction	and	allowing	for	real	non-unitarity	accompanying	measurement	eliminates	this	entire	class	of	‘paradoxes’	and	is	straightforwardly	consistent	with	what	is	already	well-corroborated	experimental	practice:	attributing	to	measured	quantum	systems	the	eigenstates	corresponding	to	their	outcomes.11			3.	Reconsidering	Real	Collapse		 In	view	of	the	makeshift	and	ad	hoc	nature	of	the	best-known	‘explicit	collapse’	model,	most	researchers	assume	that	quantum	theory	‘really’	has	only	unitary	dynamics.	This	view	is	underscored	by	Nurgalieva	and	del	Rio’s	assertion	that	‘explicit	collapse’	theories	are	‘falsifiable,’	where	they	refer	only	to	the	model	of	Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber	(1986).		That	is,	GRW	is	widely	considered	as	appropriately	exemplifying	all	physical																																																									10	Although	measurement	is	often	discussed	by	reference	to	‘agents,’	this	term	is	an	undefined	primitive.	One	cannot	object	that	a	molecule	or	degree	of	freedom	could	not	be	considered	an	agent,	since	there	is	no	demarcation	between	conscious	and	non-conscious	degrees	of	freedom.	Appeals	to	complexity	are	question-begging	and	subject	to	the	hard	problem	of	consciousness,	in	that	complexity	alone	does	not	suffice	to	confer	consciousness	or	intent	on	an	object.	11	Technically,	this	applies	to	non-destructive	measurements	in	which	a	system	is	retained	for	further	study	in	the	desired	outcome	state.	But	even	if	the	measured	system	is	destroyed,	it	is	common	practice	to	correlate	its	detected	state	with	another	degree	of	freedom	whose	prepared	state	is	determined	by	the	previous	system’s	outcome	state.	An	example	is	an	atom	placed	into	a	known	excited	state	only	if	it	absorbs	a	photon	in	a	particular	state.	Such	routine	procedures	involve	assigning	outcome-related	eigenstates	to	individual	degrees	of	freedom,	which	contravenes	the	unitary-only	description	in	which	entanglement	is	ongoing.		
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collapse	theories,	with	the	attendant	assumption	that	all	such	theories	are	crucially	different	from	quantum	theory,	achieving	collapse	only	through	an	ad	hoc	nonlinear	addition	to	the	Schrodinger	equation	that	forces	a	collapse	that	would	otherwise	never	happen.	However,	there	is	at	least	one	formulation	of	quantum	theory	with	a	natural,	physically	well-defined	non-unitary	process	constituting	the	measurement	transition,	whose	empirical	predictions	are	equivalent	to	the	unitary-only	theory	(except	that	it	also	predicts	the	observed	Boolean	event	structure	that	the	UO	theory	fails	to	predict).	That	formulation	is	the	Transactional	Interpretation.	However,	there	are	other	objective	collapse	theories	that	do	not	involve	ad	hoc	changes	to	the	Schrödinger	equation,	such	as	that	of	Penrose	(1996)	and	Jabs	(2016),		The	Transactional	Interpretation	(TI)	is	based	on	the	direct-action	or	'absorber'	theory	of	fields,	which	involves	an	underlying	time	symmetry	of	field	propagation.	Specifically,	the	direct-action	theory	uses	the	time-symmetric	propagator	instead	of	the	causal	Feynman	propagator,	but	the	latter	is	recovered	through	absorber	response,	which	gives	rise	to	non-unitarity.	Thus,	in	the	direct-action	theory,	response	of	absorbers	is	an	additional	part	of	the	dynamics	that	can	provide	a	natural	physical	non-unitarity	not	found	in	standard	approaches	to	quantum	theory,	which	neglect	the	role	of	absorption	in	processes	constituting	'measurement'	interactions.	Originated	by	Cramer	(1986),	it	has	now	been	extended	to	the	relativistic	domain	by	the	present	author	(Kastner	2012,	2016a,b,	2017,	2018,	2019a,b).	See	Kastner	and	Cramer	(2018)	for	explicit	quantification	of	the	circumstances	instantiating	non-unitarity,	and	a	physical	(as	opposed	to	information-theoretic)	derivation	of	the	Born	Rule	for	radiative	processes	in	relativistic	TI	or	‘RTI’.	12				It	is	not	the	purpose	of	this	paper	to	present	any	further	details	of	RTI,	but	merely	to	point	out	that	there	exist	perfectly	viable	objective	collapse	interpretations	that	are	empirically	equivalent	to	standard	quantum	theory	(i.e.,	conform	to	the	Born	Rule)	and	that	do	not	involve	ad	hoc	changes	to	force	collapse	that	would	otherwise	not	occur.	Thus,	GRW	is	not	an	appropriate	examplar	of	the	non-unitary	approaches	available,	and	the	common	practice	of	citing	only	GRW,	as	if	that	model	were	indicative	of	the	(high)	price	to	be	paid	for	a	non-unitary	theory,	undermines	due	consideration	of	non-unitary	approaches	as	solutions	to	problems	such	as	that	posed	by	the	FR	paradox.			 Besides	the	mistaken	perception	that	all	collapse	models	must	involve	ad	hoc	changes	to	quantum	theory,	concerns	about	real	physical	quantum	state	reduction	are	often	based	on	non-obligatory	metaphysical	assumptions.	One	is	the	conventional	assumption	that	spacetime	is	the	ultimate	‘container’	for	all	that	exists,	and	that	collapse	(therefore)	has	to	be	an	instantaneous	spacetime	process,	which	is	in	tension	with	relativity	due	to	its	apparent	frame-dependence.	(cf.	Aharonov	and	Albert	1981).		But	that	is	not	a	mandatory	problem:	collapse	can	be	understood	instead	as	the	process	of	emergence	of	invariant	spacetime	intervals,	in	a	fully	covariant,	relational	(as	opposed	to	substantival)	account	of	spacetime	which	does	not	single	out	any	preferred	frame	(Kastner,																																																									12	There	has	sometimes	been	a	stigma	attached	to	the	direct-action	theory	of	fields	based	on	its	early	abandonment	by	two	of	its	major	founders,	Wheeler	and	Feynman	(1945,	1949).	However,	John	Wheeler	was	recently	re-advocating	the	direct-action	theory	(Wesley	and	Wheeler,	2003).	The	theory	has	some	distinct	advantages,	as	discussed	in	Kastner	(2015).	The	relativistic	transactional	picture,	RTI,	decisively	overcomes	earlier	objections	such	as	the	Maudlin	objection	(Maudlin,	2002).	For	details,	see	Kastner,	2019a).	
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Kauffman	and	Epperson	2018;	Kastner	2016a).		A	related	unnecessary	assumption	is	that	any	account	of	collapse	must	predict	how	and	why	it	would	occur	‘at	a	particular	time’;	i.e.,	that	a	deterministic	account	must	be	given	for	the	time	of	collapse.	This	is	arguably	a	holdover	from	classical	thinking,	which	must	be	relinquished	if	quantum	theory	is	truly	an	indeterministic	theory	that	correctly	describes	Nature.	Under	RTI,	the	time	of	collapse	is	well-defined	to	within	the	uncertainty	principle,	which	is	an	appropriate	constraint	on	the	precision	of	any	such	prediction	(Kastner	and	Cramer	2018).		RTI	also	yields	a	natural	criterion	for	the	micro/macro	transition	zone	that	is	consistent	with	the	fact	that	we	never	see	flagrantly	macroscopic	superpositions	(Kastner	2018).				 Another	reason	to	reconsider	the	existence	of	collapse	is	that	it	resolves	the	black	hole	‘information	paradox,’	which	is	another	sort	of	paradox	that	arises	only	if	one	insists	on	unitarity	as	an	inviolable	principle.	Penrose	(1986)	has	pointed	out	that	if	measurement	is	a	non-unitary	process,	the	loss	of	information	into	a	black	hole	is	not	problematic;	it	is	simply	a	form	of	measurement.13		Thus,	a	genuinely	non-unitary	form	of	quantum	theory	dissolves	an	entire	class	of	paradoxes	based	on	‘absurd’	macroscopic	superposition,	as	well	as	solving	other	longstanding	problems	in	physics	based	on	the	possibly	unnecessary	assumption	that	quantum	unitarity	should	be	considered	an	inviolable	physical	principle.	An	additional	reason	to	question	UO	is	that	quantum	unitarity	expresses	the	conservation	of	probability,	not	of	an	actualized	physical	quantity.	There	is	no	compelling	reason	to	assume	that	the	sample	space	over	which	this	probability	is	defined	is	a	sample	space	of	actual	states	of	affairs,	especially	since	the	sample	space	contains	contrary	events	(such	as	‘detection	at	Box	A’	and	‘detection	at	Box	B’	for	a	single	quantum).	In	fact,	the	opposite	is	the	case:	if	quantum	probability	characterizes	objective	uncertainty	about	what	is	to	be	actualized	as	a	result	of	measurement,	then	the	relevant	sample	space	consists	of	possibilities.	And	since	not	all	competing	possibilities	can	be	actualized,	symmetry	must	be	broken	at	the	spacetime	level	of	actualized	events.	The	latter	is	the	physical	correlate	of	non-unitary	quantum	state	reduction.	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	this	issue,	see	Kastner,	Kauffman	and	Epperson	(2018).	
 
 5.	Conclusion		 The	FR	paradox	illustrates	the	absurdity	of	the	unitary-only	assumption	combined	with	the	common	practice	of	ignoring	the	distinction	between	a	proper	mixture	(which	can	be	interpreted	as	epistemic	ignorance	over	an	actually	possessed	state	or	outcome)	and	an	improper	mixture	(which	does	not	license	the	conclusion	that	a	particular	state	or	outcome	has	been	realized).	Of	course,	if	one	insists	on	adhering	to	UO,	one	is	forced	to	ignore	this	important	distinction	for	ostensible	(FAPP)	consistency	with	the	Boolean	event	structure	that	is	routinely	observed	in	the	laboratory	but	which	contradicts	the	unitary-only	model.	FR	shows	us	that	the	measurement	problem	has	not	gone	away,	but	instead	has	returned	in	spades	for	unitary-only	quantum	theory,	despite	the	recent	trend	of	evading	it	through	decoherence-based	approaches	that	assign	fictional	outcome	eigenstates	to	subsystems	that,	according	to	the	UO	model,	have	to	be	in	improper	mixed	states.	The	FR	scenario	is																																																									13	Banks,	Susskind	and	Peskin	(1984)	have	argued	that	non-unitarity	in	this	context	would	violate	energy	conservation,	but	that	argument	rests	on	an	apparently	overly	restrictive	assumption	and	is	critiqued	in	Nikolic	(2015).	
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thus	an	important	cautionary	tale:	it	illustrates	that	trying	to	hold	onto	the	UO	assumption	in	the	face	of	the	Boolean	structure	of	observed	experimental	results	is	arguably	a	no-go.14				Under	UO,	there	can	be	no	actual	single	outcomes,	no	ontologically	real	Boolean	structure	‘out	there	in	the	world’;	since	that	would	imply	non-unitary	collapse	with	respect	to	any	observable	for	which	more	than	one	outcome	is	possible	given	the	prepared	state,	which	contradicts	the	UO	assumption.	Under	UO,	there	can	be	no	actual	transition	from	non-
Boolean	to	Boolean	event	structure.	Thus,	a	utilitarian,	Bohrian	account	of	‘collapse’	is	necessarily	observer-dependent	and	instrumentalist:	collapse	is	no	more	than	a	useful	fiction.	In	such	an	approach,	the	attribution	of	an	eigenstate	corresponding	to	a	measurement	outcome	can	never	be	anything	but	a	non-referring	instrument	that	an	observer	applies	for	his	own	convenience.	In	fact,	it’s	not	optional:	he	has	to,	since	his	Boolean	experience	refutes	the	non-Boolean	character	of	the	UO	formalism.	Yet,	since	the	Bohrian	account	allows	only	one	‘macrolevel’	for	any	given	experimental	situation,	under	certain	conditions	(the	future	existence	of	a	super-observer	W	as	in	the	FR	scenario)	it	must	deny	that	an	ordinary	human	experimenter	(analogous	to	F)	observes	a	definite	macro-level	outcome—which	has	never	been	experimentally	corroborated.	Meanwhile,	in	contrast,	it	is	the	collapsed,	determinate,	Boolean	description	that	is	always	corroborated.				 It	is	of	course	possible,	under	UO,	to	evade	the	outright	FR	contradiction	and	still	retain	some	vestige	of	the	idea	that	quantum	states	can	be	ontologically	referring	by	recourse	to	a	suitable	hidden-variable	theory.		An	example	is	the	Bell-Bohm	theory	discussed	by	Sudbery	(2016),	which	treats	the	standard	quantum	state	as	a	governing	‘pilot’	state,	while	the	‘collapsed’	state	corresponds	to	a	‘beable’	state	corresponding	to	the	real	property	possessed	by	the	system.	But	in	such	an	approach,	F	is	still	not	allowed	to	use	the	outcome	(beable)	state	to	predict	future	outcomes	contingent	on	the	existence	of	a	super-observer.	Sudbery	notes	that	in	such	a	theory,	pilot	state	components	corresponding	to	outcomes	not	realized	by	an	experimenter	at	the	level	of	F	would	still	be	in	play	to	influence	future	measurements.	Thus	again,	under	UO,	the	observed	outcome	eigenstate	cannot	be	viewed	as	a	full	and	accurate	description	of	the	detected	system.				The	appropriate	conclusion	is	that	it	is	unitary-only	quantum	theory	that	is	suspect,	and	renewed	consideration	should	be	given	to	the	possibility	that	Nature	has	real	non-unitary	quantum	state	reduction	or	‘collapse.’	For	in	the	latter	case,	the	outcome	eigenstates	that	we	always	assign	in	the	laboratory	and	that	are	always	corroborated	cease	to	be	fictional;	instead	they	are	accurate	representations	of	the	physics.	When	F	measures	his	system,	there	really	is	an	actual	outcome.	So	W	will	never	assign	a	pure	entangled	state	to	F,	his	apparatus	and	his	lab,	and	consistency	is	restored.	All	the	problems	pointed	to	by	this	class	of	paradoxes	vanish	(as	well	as	others,	such	as	the	black	hole	information	paradox).																																																													14	Everettians	might	say	that	they	can	keep	UO	by	denying	single	outcomes,	but	the	noted	sentence	remains	accurate,	since	what	is	empirically	corroborated	is	a	Boolean	structure	of	single	outcomes:	nobody	ever	reports	seeing	all	possible	outcomes	or	even	more	than	one	possible	outcome.	Everettians	must	posit	instead	a	(non-corroborated)	set	of	all	possible	outcomes,	viewed	by	myriad	postulated	observer	counterparts,	in	order	to	retain	UO.		
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